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It is never easy for an author to respond to critics of his work - especially those who 
combine deep knowledge of the subject with the scientific detachment and sensitivity 
of the four critics who have reviewed War, States and Contention in this symposium. 
More challenging still, they approach the book from the diverse standpoints of Italian 
historiography (Procacci); the domestic implications of militarization (Artioli); compara-
tive politics (Kriesi);  and social movements (della Porta). I am mainly in agreement 
with my critics' complaints (these are the "four marriages" in the title of this comment) 
so I will therefore limit myself to only a few reactions to each contribution. I will close 
with a question on important work that I think remains to be done on war, states and 
contention. 
Drawing on her vast knowledge of World War One and its aftermath, both in Italy 
and elsewhere, Giovanna Procacci, offers a number of sensitive reflections on War, 
States and Contention. First, she gently points out that the book ignores the im-
portance of the protests of women, and other "unorganized" actors, during World War 
One. In this, she is entirely correct: Women protested about food, work, and other is-
sues as they took over  jobs normally carried out by men who were in the trenches. Be-
cause it was focused on the roots of fascism in the war, my book dealt, perhaps exces-
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sively, on more formal movements of both right and left, rather than on the vast a-
mount of social turbulence that was caused by the war and its dislocations. 
Second, drawing on her original work in Warfare-Welfare, Procacci also shows that 
increases in social assistance accompanied the restrictions in civil liberties in Italy dur-
ing the war, a complementarity and apparent contradiction that my book largely ig-
nored. Of course, as her work also shows, social assistance came late, was poorly ad-
ministered, and led to charges of malfeasance at war's end. Still -- although less so in 
Italy than in its allies -- the government recognized that the war imposed dislocations 
that needed to be addressed. My book was more focused on the costs to citizens than 
on the state's attempts to offer them benefits. If Italy differed from its allies, it was in 
the relative indiffence to citizens’ and soldiers’ sufferings during the war (Procacci her-
self has exposed the indifference of the general staff to the sufferings of Italian prison-
ers of war) and to the more rapid scaling down of social assistance in war's wake, a re-
duction that may have contributed to the bitterness among the ex-combattenti, many 
of whom gravitated towards the emerging fasci  of Benito Mussolini. Just as the Italian 
elite did not grasp the seriousness of intervening in a modern war against well-
equipped modern armies, its members had no idea of what was necessary to return to 
peacetime. 
A third issue raised by Procacci regards the role of contentious politics in Italian in-
tervention and in the war's outcomes. She argues in her review  that "agitations [in 
1914] were [therefore] a partial cause of entry into the war", a hypothesis that is sup-
ported from the correspondence of Sonnino (quoted by Rusconi 2014:210). The hy-
pothesis is reasonable, but I wonder, upon reflection, whether a more fundamental 
reason for Italy’s willingness to intervene was not the "high politics" of interest in terri-
torial aggrandizement and the very  "low politics" of bribes paid to members of the 
elite by the opposing sides to gain Italy's support? 
About the role of contention in the war's outcome, there is less ambiguity, but there 
remains a debate about the role of the post-war labor agitations in bringing on Musso-
lini's rise. Conservative scholars (i.e., Lipset, 1960) see a shared responsibility between 
the  worker’s movement and the fascists; but the evidence is that the triennio 
rivoluzionario had already collapsed when fascist violence peaked, as the declining 
strike rate among both peasants and workers in 1921 shows. If there was a link be-
tween leftwing and rightwing contention, it was the intervening role of the conserva-
tive press in hyping the danger of an ottobre italiano, the complicity of the police and 
the army in abetting fascist violence, and the incapacity of the political class to form a 
coalition that could respond to the threat of eversion. But these are issues that may 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(1) 2015: 322-326,  DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i1p322 
 
325 
 
never be resolved; probably, as Procacci's own contributions demonstrate, there was 
no single cause for the collapse of the Liberal state and the advent of its successor.  
With his usual gift for illuminating synthesis, Hanspeter Kriesi takes a comparative 
approach to War, States and Contention. Focusing on the book's contemporary analysis 
of the United States after 9/11, he points to the exceptional nature of the American 
warfare state by comparing it to the declining importance of war and war-related ex-
penditures in America's European allies. He is correct in this, as Tilly demonstrated in 
his classic, Coercion, Capital and European States (1992).Where America and Europe 
are following similar tracks -- although at different speeds-  is in the growing importan-
ce of Mary Kaldor;s "new wars", which combine state and non-state combatants, con-
ventional and unconventional tactics, and a growing indifference to the laws of war.  
Without exaggerating the greater European attachment to rights after the terrorist 
outrages of the early years of the century, I am persuaded of the "trickle-down" effects 
of America's drift into "war-time" (Dudziak 2010). As my colleague, Joseph Margulies, 
writes in his notable book, What Changed When Everything Changed (2013), emergen-
cy rule has increasingly infiltrated the American creed, even as Americans continue to 
see it as a buttress of liberty. As constitutional lawyers have shown,  the exceptional 
rules that have increasingly governed American national security regulations have 
"trickled down" into non-national security law and practice, for example, in the milita-
rization of local police forces, the increasing use of the state-secrets doctrine in private 
law, and the spinoff of national security concerns into immigration practices. 
But Kriesi is correct in insisting on the comparative implications of the American 
state of warfare and security, because – as his own work on globalization and politics 
has shown – borders are increasingly declining in importance. Not only do transnation-
al movements  infiltrate across these borders, but international institutions and police 
practices increasingly combat them, as Chapter Ten of War, States and Contention at-
tempts to show. This is the second “wedding” in the title of this comment. 
The implication of the military for domestic and especially for urban policy in Italy 
and France is the original contribution of Francesca Artioli (2013, 2014). The origin of 
the interactions between cities and the military was, of course, the state of siege which 
legal historian, Sebastien Le Gal has explicated in a series of pathbreaking articles and 
in his thesis, Les Origines de l’État de Siège en France; Ancien Régime - Révolution. As 
Le Gal shows,  the French revolutionary governments made increasing use of the état 
de siege, expanding its meaning from the protection of military fortresses on the bor-
der to a tool for martial rule of cities and departments and the suppression of dissi-
dence.  
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But that was then and this is now: Artioli's work on the relationship between milita-
rization and urban policy and politics in France and Italy could well have enriched the 
analysis of the militarization of civilian life in the United States in my book. For exam-
ple, as her review points out there was a hidden link between military security and ur-
ban sprawl during the cold war. I wish I had known of this work when I wrote my book.  
Artioli is perplexed at the analytical status of a key concept in the book - Michael 
Mann's concept of "infrastructural power". She worries that, at times, the concept is 
employed to describe the American state's forays into civil society - for example, 
through defense contracts --while, at other times, I employed it to describe increased 
state dependence on civil society and - by implication -- giving leverage to civil society 
actors – like Edward Snowden -- to challenge the state. She is right that the book em-
phasizes these contradictory trends in the American state's expansion, and she is also 
right to point to the increasing imbrication between infrastructural and despotic power 
in wartime. My answer to her complaint is that infrastructural power is inherently con-
tradictory -- what Kriesi, in his review, describes as the "dialectic of control." If nothing 
else, it is this ambiguity that helps to explain the sometimes repressive, but sometimes 
reformist outcomes of war making for civil liberties and for the growth of the state in 
wartime.  
The Vietnam war illustrates this dialectic best. During that war, the Nixon admini-
stration and the FBI impinged on civil liberties in an illegal and anti-constitutional man-
ner; yet only a few years later, Nixon was forced to resign in disgrace, while Congress 
passed a series of state-controlling and rights-expanding laws. Artioli is correct that 
War, States and Contention would have done well to have explicated these contradic-
tions and to have extended the analysis of hierarchical and infrastructural power be-
yond the United States in the last decade. This is the third “wedding” in the title of this 
comment. 
My friend and former collaborator, Donatella della Porta, focusses her review on the 
role of peace movements during warlike episodes and gently charges me with a too-
pessimistic account of these movements' rapid decline. She proposes another narra-
tive, that "peace movements could be considered, under several respects, a very suc-
cessful one". She correctly points out that peace movements have made states increas-
ingly wary of becoming involved in warmaking, and that they have also "been very in-
fluential in its impact on other movements" -- such as the women's movement, non-
violent movements and international solidarity. I could not agree more with della 
Porta, and this is the fourth “wedding” in the title of this comment. 
However, as Chapter 5 underscores, and as Kriesi's review points out, America's 
wars of the 21st century are different than past wars, because they are fought in 
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peacetime against non-state actors, and they have had no major impact on the lives of 
the civilian population. These "new wars" have been difficult for peace activists to con-
test, partly because of the difficulty of focusing public opinion on war's costs, partly be-
cause of the fear that the enemy is potentially present in "the homeland," and partly 
because opposition has been fragmented among three main movements -- legal mobi-
lization, the mobilization of civil society groups, and opposition to surveillance. Of 
course, all peace movements are coalitions, but unlike the anti-Vietnam war move-
ment, opposition today is more dispersed in both movement space and time. 
This takes me to the "question" in the title of this reply. The Whig theory of history 
held that  rights were the result of the civilizing mission of bourgeois society and were 
set to improve incrementally and to expand from legal to political to social rights, as 
T.H. Marshall argued (1964). We have become more cautious about the inevitability of 
rights expansion since Marshall wrote, but are we seeing the opposite of his vision: a 
general rollback of rights in the wake of global neo-liberalism, war, and the emergency 
state? And what is the role of contentious politics in contesting this development? My 
book, which examines only four cases of war and rights over the past two centuries, 
does not claim to answer this question -- if it has an answer. My question in closing is: 
"What would it take to answer it: A larger number of intensive case studies like the 
ones I offer in my book? A methodological shift to a large-N examination using the 
tools of quantitative analysis like those we find in the "conflict studies" tradition in the 
United States? Or a combination of the two? Answering this question is beyond the 
scope of this brief essay, but my four much-too-generous critics have helped me to see 
its importance, for which they deserve my thanks. 
 
